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Creating Maryland’s Paper Money Economy, 1720-1739: 
The Role of Power, Print, and Markets* 
 
The British North American colonies were the first western economies to rely on 
legislature-issued fiat paper money as their principal internal medium of exchange. This 
system arose piecemeal across the colonies making the paper money creation story for 
each colony unique. It was true monetary experimentation on a grand scale. The creation 
story for Maryland, perhaps the most unique among the colonies, is analyzed to evaluate 
how market forces, media influences, and the power of various constituents combined to 
shape its particular paper money system.  
 
The British North American colonies were the first western economies to experiment 
with large scale reliance on legislature-issued fiat paper monies. These monetary 
experimentations were neither uniform nor coordinated across the colonies. They were instituted 
piecemeal—at different times with different motivations and goals. Their institutional structures 
and relative performances varied as well. While not consciously intended to be so, either by the 
colonies as a group or by the British Crown, this was monetary experimentation on a grand scale. 
To grasp the importance of these monetary experiments the individual creation stories need to be 
understood. No creation story is more unique than that for the Maryland paper pound.  
Maryland was a relative late-comer to issuing its own paper money. Massachusetts was 
the first in 1690, followed by South Carolina in 1703, New York and New Jersey in 1709, Rhode 
Island in 1710, North Carolina in 1712, Pennsylvania in 1723, Maryland in 1733, and finally 
Virginia and Georgia in 1755 (Brock, 1975; Grubb, 2003, p. 1779). In the first six cases, paper 
money was created as a solution to the short-run fiscal crises caused by emergency military 
spending during King William’s and Queen Anne’s Wars, 1689-1697 and 1702-1713, 
respectively. Georgia and Virginia’s initial creation of their paper monies was also induced by 
wartime emergency spending, in their case in reference to the Seven Year’s War, 1755-1762. 
Paper money becoming a permanent medium of exchange in the peacetime economies of these   2
colonies was not necessarily the motive behind these experiments in emergency wartime finance 
though for many colonies it evolved in that direction. 
The first colony to issue paper money without it being motivated by some emergency 
wartime fiscal crisis was Pennsylvania in 1723. The goal was to ameliorate an economic crisis 
caused by a temporary depression in the colony’s trade balance that arose in the aftermath of 
Queen Anne’s War. This monetary experiment was also not necessarily intended to be 
permanent. The paper money issued was to be removed from circulation by the end of the 
decade—presumably once the trade depression had passed. No replacement paper money was 
automatically slated to take its place. In 1729, paper-money advocates in Pennsylvania, e.g. 
Benjamin Franklin, won the debate to renew and expand the paper money experiment and turn it 
into a more-or-less permanent feature of the peacetime economy of that colony (Brock, 1975; 
Grubb, 2006; Lester, 1938).  
  In 1733 Maryland became the second colony to initiate a paper money system that was 
not motivated by a wartime fiscal crisis. Maryland’s initial authorization, 90,000 Maryland paper 
pounds, was also the largest in nominal terms of any of the initial authorizations among the 
colonies. From the beginning, Maryland’s paper money experiment was intended to be a 
permanent restructuring of the medium of exchange within the colony. Its goal was tied to 
transforming the transatlantic tobacco trade which in turn required demonetarization of tobacco 
within the colony. The tobacco-market paper-money nexus was unique to Maryland. It produced 
an unusual and complex story for the creation of the Maryland paper pound in terms of the role 
of the print media in the monetary debate, the alignment of the pro- and anti-paper money 
constituents within the colony, the size of the initial authorization of paper money, and the 
resulting design and performance of Maryland’s paper money system.   3
Unique Features of Maryland’s Paper Money Story 
  Maryland was the second colony to initiate a paper money system in peacetime. As such, 
it had peacetime goals and peacetime problems to overcome. Maryland was also the first colony 
from the start to intend its paper money to be a permanent feature of its economy. Two-thirds of 
the paper money in its initial authorization was not required to be redeemed and removed from 
circulation for 30 years. Other colonies set the redemption of their initial issuances of paper 
money at shorter intervals, though the exigency of war often delayed that redemption. For 
example, New York’s initial authorizations in 1709 were to be redeemed within 4 years, New 
Jersey’s and Rhode Island’s within 10 years, and Pennsylvania’s within 8 years (Brock, 1975, 
pp. 38, 66, 78, 85, 101-102, 108, 116, 462). 
Maryland’s initial paper money authorization was the single largest in absolute nominal 
terms of any colony, see Table 1. While scholars have noted this large initial authorization and 
thought that it contributed to the early problems and loss of value of Maryland’s paper money, 
the comparison is a bit deceptive. When converted into standardized units, namely into per capita 
amounts of a common currency such as pounds sterling, Maryland’s initial amount of paper 
money authorized is about in the middle of the pack, just slightly above the 0.614 pounds sterling 
per capita average for the ten colonies listed in Table 1. Compared with Pennsylvania’s initial 
authorizations in 1723-1724, i.e. compared with her closest sister colony in terms of geographic 
location, year of initial paper money emission, and peacetime motivations for the paper money 
emitted, Maryland authorized 15 percent less paper money value per capita. Considering that by 
1736 Maryland had only actually emitted 58,000 of the 90,000 Maryland pounds authorized in 
1733, for a 0.441 pounds sterling per capita equivalent, further reinforces the case that 
Maryland’s initial paper money offering relative to other colonies was sensible, even cautious,   4
and in no way extraordinarily large (Brock, 1975, pp. 104-105). Initial emission size per se was 
not an issue and so not a contributor to the depreciation that would soon follow relative to that 
experienced in other colonies (Gould, 1915, pp. 88-89). 
Table 1   Initial Authorization of Paper Money in Each Colony 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
              Nominal  Amount   Per-Capita  Amount 
    Peace     Authorized  (in  “pounds”  in  Pounds Sterling 
Colony     Year  or War         of that colony)          Equivalents 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Massachusetts   1690  War        7,000     0.108 
 
South Carolina   1703  War        4,000       0.367 
 
New  York   1709  War    13,000     0.406 
 
New  Jersey   1709  War        3,000     0.101 
 
Rhode  Island   1710  War    40,000     1.979 
 
North Carolina  1712-  War        4,000 plus      0.163 
   1713         8,000     0.471 
 
Pennsylvania   1723-  Peace    15,000  plus    0.287 
   1724     30,000     0.801 
 
Maryland   1733  Peace    90,000     0.685 
 
Virginia   1755  War    20,000  plus    0.054 
       40,000     0.162 
 
Georgia   1755  War        7,000  (sterling)   1.056 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes and Sources: Population estimates are taken from Historical Statistics (1975, p. 1168) with 
linear interpolation between dates reported. Exchange rates to pounds sterling are taken from 
McCusker (1975) with Maryland’s rate for 1733 being taken as the hard currency rate and Rhode 
Island’s rate for 1715 being assumed to be the same as Massachusetts rate for 1718. Nominal 
amounts authorized are taken from Ernst (1973, pp. 47-48) and Brock (1975, pp. 21, 38, 66-73, 
82-93, 100, 108, 462). 
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  Maryland’s method of backing or supporting the value of its paper money was unique. 
Other colonies supported the value of their paper monies by allowing the colony’s taxes to be 
paid in that colony’s paper money (a legal tender for public debts), by making it to some degree 
a legal tender within the colony for non-public debts, and by issuing it in the form of land-
mortgage-backed loans to subjects within the colony. While employing these methods to some 
extent, Maryland also created a sinking fund out of which the paper money would be redeemed 
at par in sterling, one-third in 15 years and two-thirds in 30 years. The revenue for the sinking 
fund would come from a tax on tobacco exports that would be invested in Bank-of-England 
stock. At the same time, Maryland created a complex set of exceptions regarding which of its 
taxes could be paid in its paper money and when they could be paid in paper money as opposed 
to being paid in tobacco or sterling—a more complex set of exceptions than found in other 
colonies (Behrens, 1923, pp. 18-21, 29-45).  
  Maryland’s method of injecting paper money into the economy from its initial 
authorization was also unique. While Maryland, like the other colonies, injected some of its 
paper money via land-mortgage-backed loans to its subjects and via direct spending by the 
legislature on building projects, etc., these methods represented relatively small injections for 
Maryland. Over half of Maryland’s initial authorization was simply handed out to its subjects. 
The master of each family received 30 shillings of paper money for each adult person (taxable) 
in the family, ostensibly in exchange for burning 300 pounds of trash tobacco per taxable in the 
family. No other colony engaged in such a monetary injection method, basically giving money 
away in the hopes of crop control (Behrens, 1923, pp. 18-21, 29-45).  
  Finally, the political alignments that produced Maryland’s initial paper money legislation 
were unique. The usual conflicts between the lower and upper classes (tradesmen and poor   6
backcountry farmers versus wealthy landowners and merchants) and between the indigenous 
colony-rights party and the proprietor-rights party in terms of being pro- versus anti-paper 
money, respectively, were either absent in Maryland or greatly transformed from what existed in 
other colonies. During much of the paper money debates from 1727 through 1733 the governor 
of Maryland, Benedict Leonard Calvert, was the Lord Proprietor’s brother. The disagreements 
and compromises between the upper and lower legislative houses of Maryland over the paper 
money bills do not follow the typical pro- versus anti-paper money lines seen elsewhere. The 
Proprietor himself, Lord Baltimore, was actually in the province and presided over the legislature 
when the final paper money bill was crafted and passed in 1733—agreed to by all parties 
(Behrens, 1923, pp. 9-28). How did such a complex consensus come about? The key to 
understanding the complexity and uniqueness of Maryland’s paper money creation story lies in 
Maryland’s role in the transatlantic tobacco trade and tobacco’s role as money in the Maryland 
economy. 
Maryland’s Tobacco “Money” Economy 
  Maryland was a tobacco colony. From the 17
th into the early 18
th century it can even be 
characterized as having a tobacco monoculture particularly with regard to exports (McCusker 
and Menard, 1985, pp. 117-143; Schweitzer, 1980). Tobacco growing was so ubiquitous that 
pounds of tobacco became the universal measure for all other values, payments, wages, fees, 
taxes, court costs, fines, and so on within the province. While the Maryland government never 
declared tobacco to be the official money of the province, all parish, all county, and all 
provincial levies (taxes)—with the exception of customs duties, all fines and court charges, and 
all ecclesiastical and official fees were regularly assessed in tobacco. The ubiquitous poll tax was 
assessed in tobacco which affected all families within the colony. Tobacco was the de facto   7
“money” of the colony as a measure of value, but also in a particular way as a medium of 
exchange (Gould, 1915, pp. 38-77).  
  Marylanders did not carry tobacco leaves around in their pockets as cash nor did they 
typically make payments directly with tobacco “product” for individual items they purchased in 
person. Tobacco was a fragile commodity that could easily deteriorate when excessively handled 
or improperly stored (Middleton, 1984, pp. 112-113). What were typically traded or used as the 
medium of exchange were claims on tobacco production or the credits arising from the sale of 
tobacco in England (Gould, 1915, pp. 38-77). Planters could acquire imported goods by directly 
trading tobacco for goods from vessels that arrived in the Chesapeake from Britain. They could 
also barter tobacco for local and/or imported goods from storekeeper-merchants often on credit, 
i.e. book credit. Typically these storekeeper-merchants were connected to tobacco shipping 
merchant-houses in Britain. At stores in the Chesapeake, goods would be priced in so many 
pounds of tobacco of the next harvest. After the next harvest the planter would deliver the 
tobacco to clear the book credit debt. To what extent book credits were traded to third parties and 
so could become a medium of exchange in tobacco credits is unclear. If it happened at all, it was 
not extensive. This book-credit style of tobacco money was barter using a commodity numeraire 
on a narrow trade-channel connecting tobacco growers to export/import merchants (Middleton, 
1984, pp. 116-123; Price, 1980, pp. 16-17; Price, 1995, I, pp. 195-196, II, p. 509, IV, pp. 11-14, 
VII, p. 65).  
Tobacco was principally exported to England. For local planters or merchant-shippers 
who consigned their tobacco to commission agents or factors in England for sale, the sale of their 
tobacco there gave rise to credits in pounds sterling that the planter or local merchant-shipper 
could draw on, via bills of exchange on their account in London, to purchase imports from   8
England or trade said bills in Maryland to purchase local goods, clear local debts, or pay local 
taxes, fees, and fines. These “tobacco” bills of exchange were like checks drawn on one’s “bank” 
in England (Middleton, 1984, p. 116-117). They could be used as a medium of exchange in 
Maryland, namely passed between parties to pay for goods or clear debts, like a third, fourth, 
fifth party check today.  
Like a third party check, however, there was always some risk and transactions cost 
involved in their use. There was a chance that the bill would be protested and not honored by the 
account holder in England because of insufficient funds in the account of the party on whom the 
original bill was drawn. Such protests were not infrequent (Gould, 1915, p. 38). The more times 
a bill changed hands in Maryland and so the farther away from the original holder it got, the 
greater the uncertainty and so the greater the risk that the bill might be no good. Just the amount 
of time between tobacco planting, harvesting, packing, shipping, and sale in England, 
communication of the credits that arose from that sale, and then the return of a bill of exchange 
drawn in Maryland on those credits was lengthy enough to create uncertainty and so risk that a 
bill might be no good. On the other hand, the value of the reputation garnered by established 
planters engaging in repeat trade in tobacco to England in always having sufficient tobacco 
credits to support the bills drawn on them may have been strong enough to counter such risks—
at least for the subset of bills drawn on these high-reputation planters (Middleton, 1984, pp. 118-
119, 122).  
The consignment system that generated these bills-of-exchange money, however, only 
accounted for maybe one-third of tobacco exports. It was concentrated among the large planters 
where scale economies made it practical, i.e. among planters who could produce a large number 
of hogsheads (barrels) of tobacco for export.
1  For small planters, many of whom produced under   9
a hogshead of tobacco or at best not much more than one hogshead, the transaction costs were 
too high to make consignment arrangements worthwhile. If nothing else, someone else had to 
pack (prize) their tobacco into a hogshead before being exported. As such, small planters 
typically sold their tobacco outright directly to merchant-shippers or local large planters for 
goods, store credits, or to clear book-credit debts (Carr, 1988, pp. 342-388; Earle, 1975, pp. 26-
28; Clemens, 1980, pp. 85-86, 172-173; Middleton, 1984, pp. 116-123; Price, 1973, pp. 658-659, 
661-663; Price, 1980, pp. 6, 100-101, 121-122, 124-127, 130-132; Price, 1995, IV, pp. 11-14, 
19-24, 29-31, VII, p. 65; Russo, 1988, pp. 389-432).  
Bills of exchange drawn on accounts in England that arose from a large planter’s sale of 
tobacco there on consignment were also typically issued in larger denominations. They were 
valuable for transacting large trades or paying large debts in Maryland, but they were costly to 
“make change” with or issue in small denominations. This was due, in part, to the transaction 
and risk costs of redeeming bills of exchange drawn in Maryland on accounts in England 
swamping the value of small denomination bills. As such, bills of exchange were not a ready 
medium of exchange for transacting most local trades within Maryland.
2 
The Maryland government collected its taxes, fees, and fines expressed in tobacco units 
through its county sheriffs. Because most taxes were small, well under a hogshead of tobacco, 
the tobacco taxes collected were in bundles or “hands” of loose leaf from each taxpayer. The 
sheriff of each district was responsible for collecting the taxes owed by each subject after that 
year’s tobacco harvest. He was paid a percentage commission on the amount collected. Given 
that one of the significant taxes was a poll tax in tobacco units (a fixed amount per poll or adult) 
and thus a tax affecting every household head in the colony, using the local sheriff to collect 
taxes made cost-effective sense in terms of both collection costs and compliance monitoring. The   10
sheriff deposited the collected tobacco with either the eastern or western shore treasurer for 
Maryland depending on each sheriff’s jurisdiction (Owings, 1953, pp. 3, 59-61, 67-71).  
From that point it is a little unclear what the colonial government did with its tobacco tax 
revenue. Individual subjects who were owed fees and fines in tobacco would presumably come 
to the public treasurer and claimed their loose hands of tobacco (Archives of Maryland, 35, pp. 
233, 351). They would in turn presumably sell this tobacco outright directly for bills of 
exchange, goods, store credits, or to clear book credit debts to local planters or merchant-
shippers, who would in turn pack the tobacco into hogsheads and have it shipped to England. 
Whether the government itself packed its own loose hands of tobacco into hogsheads and then 
sold it directly to merchant-shippers, local planters, or put it on consignment to English factors 
for bills of exchange, goods, or store credits is unclear. Likewise, whether the government paid 
for its purchases directly in its loose hands of tobacco revenue or sold its loose hands of tobacco 
to local planters or merchant-shippers for bills of exchange, goods, or store credits that were then 
transferred to the government’s payee is also unclear. Compelling evidence of such has not been 
yet found. The government did have some truck with bills of exchange, but to what extent and 
how often is unclear (Gould, 1915, pp. 42-44, 62). 
For subjects who owed taxes in tobacco units but grew no tobacco, they would have to 
acquire tobacco or tobacco credits of some type from someone with tobacco in the colony 
through barter for other goods, either a neighbor who still grew tobacco or a local store-merchant 
who still dealt in book credits cleared through payment in harvested tobacco. How exactly this 
was done by the typical non-tobacco grower is unclear. No compelling evidence has been found 
yet. It would seem that when a neighbor always grew tobacco or a local store dealt heavily in 
tobacco credits, such barter exchange may have been relatively low cost. But as the economy   11
diversified and whole locales stopped growing tobacco, the transactions cost of finding someone 
with tobacco or a store-merchant dealing in tobacco credits with whom to barter goods in order 
to acquire the tobacco needed to pay one’s taxes to the local sheriff got increasingly costly 
relative to just continuing to plant (inefficiently) a little (trash) tobacco—just enough to cover 
one’s tobacco taxes. Some tobacco taxes could be paid in money, though as explained below 
specie was relatively hard to come by. 
One aspect of tobacco as “money” is seldom discussed. Tobacco is not homogeneous. 
Besides differing qualities or grades of tobacco from trash to middling to good, tobacco also 
came in different varieties. There was “sweet-scent” grown mostly in Virginia that was preferred 
by the English consuming public. There was “Oronoco” grown principally in Maryland but also 
in substantial quantities in Virginia that was preferred by the French consuming public, and there 
was “bright-leaf” grown largely in Maryland and preferred in the Dutch market. The Oronoco 
variety also had distinctly recognizable sub-varieties—some a closer substitute for “sweet-scent” 
than others (Middleton, 1984, pp. 109-111; Price, 1973, pp. 651, 666-668; Price, 1995, II, p. 
510). The different varieties with their different European market niches each with their different 
quality grades yielded considerable price variation among tobaccos. Yet Maryland governmental 
taxes, fines, fees, etc. and most private barter transactions were priced in just so many pounds of 
tobacco (sometimes in pounds of “good” tobacco), as though tobacco was a homogeneous good. 
As such, tobacco “money” had a hard time circulating as an efficient medium of exchange. 
The tobacco monoculture and tobacco export trade to England also explains why specie, 
the international medium of exchange, tended to be scarce in Maryland, so much so that it could 
seldom function as an effective medium of exchange within the colony (Archives of Maryland, v. 
36, pp. 469-470, v. 37, pp. 337-338). Maryland produced no gold or silver, so specie could only   12
be acquired via trade. The export of tobacco to England on consignment did not yield payments 
in specie as specie exports from Britain were restricted. These tobacco sales in England only 
generated credits-on-account in London that could be drawn on. Typically British North 
American colonies could only acquire specie via trade surpluses with Spanish and/or Portuguese 
America. The nature of Maryland’s tobacco export trade more or less ruled that out. Only with 
the rise of wheat culture and the provisioning trade in the later colonial period were there some 
trade surpluses generated with Spanish and Portuguese America that yielded increased specie 
pass through—imports of specie from trade surpluses with Spanish America being re-exported to 
England to pay for even more English imports. In the meantime, some specie could linger in the 
economy for a while before being exported and so served to some limited extent as an internal 
medium of exchange. Such a shift toward specie money would be hard to do as long as tobacco 
exports to England dominated the Maryland economy. Under such conditions, specie would 
remain scarce.
3 
In conclusion, tobacco “money” as a medium of exchange was a hybrid of book credit 
and contract commodity-money. As a barter economy, it was highly efficient within the narrow 
trade channel of tobacco planter/grower through export/import merchant. Outside that channel, 
the transactions cost of extended circulation of tobacco “money” to support internal exchange 
within the colony was high, and got higher as the chain of parties through which the tobacco 
“money” passed increased until being ultimately redeemed for the actual sterling credits 
accumulated in London or the imported good they represented.  
In the end, what everyone in Maryland wanted—whether merchant, planter, storekeeper, 
churchman, or government official—were foreign trade credits. These were needed to acquire 
imports, and in a highly non-diversified monoculture economy such as Maryland, imports are   13
what made life worth living. Thus, what anchored the end of the barter chain in tobacco and 
ultimately gave tobacco money a “currency” was that it led directly and ultimately to these 
foreign trade credits, namely to the imported goods themselves or to bills of exchange that could 
be drawn on British pound sterling credits in London.  
Advocates for the Demonetarization of Tobacco in Maryland 
  There were three advocates of demonetarizing tobacco in Maryland. The first were 
smalltime planter/farmers and tradesmen who had shifted away from growing tobacco and found 
the transactions cost of acquiring tobacco to pay their provincial taxes burdensome. The second 
were large wealthy planter/merchants in the tobacco trade who wanted to drive up the price of 
tobacco. The third was the Proprietor/Maryland government who wanted to lower the cost of tax 
and quit-rent collection and increase the value of the revenues collected, by eliminating payment 
in trashy tobaccos. A coincidence of events brought these three constituencies together in the late 
1720s and early 1730s. 
a. The shift away from tobacco monoculture 
By the early 18
th century the transition from a tobacco monoculture to a more diversified 
agricultural economy was noticeably underway, especially on the eastern shore of the 
Chesapeake. Tobacco had exhausted soil fertility in many areas, particularly on the eastern shore. 
Wheat cultivation had profitably displaced tobacco in these areas. Transatlantic shipping 
disruptions caused by the almost constant warfare from King William’s through Queen Anne’s 
War (1689-1713) and the trade depression in the immediate aftermath of these wars obscured the 
impact of this transition on the internal trade structure of the colony. With the return of 
peacetime trade patterns by the 1720s and with the re-entry of French buyers into the British 
tobacco market, the strains to the old way of paying colonial taxes became apparent. Political   14
redress by Maryland’s non-tobacco planters was increasingly sought (Carr, 1988, pp. 342-388; 
Clemens, 1980; Middleton, 1984, pp. 135-136, 141-143; Price, 1973, pp. 268-301, 379, 509-530, 
664, 671; Price, 1995, II, pp. 497-498, 510-511; Russo, 1988, pp. 389-432).  
Between 1719 and 1725 petitions were received by the Maryland legislature complaining 
about paying taxes in tobacco, most notably from locations where relatively less tobacco culture 
was now present, such as from the city of Annapolis and the fringe eastern shore counties of 
Somerset and Cecil (Gould, 1915, p. 52). Only the petition from Somerset County on October 
11, 1725, however, pointedly asked to substitute some other method for paying tobacco taxes. 
This request “that Somerset County and some others that cannot make any quantity of Tobacco 
or flax may have the Liberty of paying their publick dues in Country Commodities” appears to 
have been granted by both Maryland’s lower and upper legislative houses, though whether it was 
approved by the governor is as yet unclear (Archives of Maryland, 33, pp. 398-399, 578; 34, p. 
613; 35, pp. 313-315, 410). 
With the exception noted above, these petitions were principally if not exclusively 
interested in manipulating the tobacco price of taxes. Tobacco taxes were typically expressed in 
so much current money or its tobacco equivalent with 10 shilling current money being rated by 
the legislature as the same as 100 pounds of tobacco. Current money was the Maryland pound 
which was purely a unit of account money—there was no physical Maryland pound yet. It was 
set at 1.333 Maryland pounds being equal to 1 pound sterling (McCusker, 1978, pp. 189-199). 
Given that 100 pounds of tobacco was sometimes worth more than 10 shilling current money and 
sometime less, in which unit to enforce the tax assessment—tobacco or current money—
mattered. People naturally wanted to choose the unit that got them the most gain or the least tax 
payment.     15
When tobacco prices were high (above 10 shillings per 100 pounds) subjects wanted to 
pay their taxes as assessed in current money because it would require less tobacco than 100 
pounds to satisfy a 10 shilling tax. Whereas, the sheriff wanted to assess and collect the tax in 
tobacco at 100 pounds per 10 shilling tax assessment because the tobacco could be sold for more 
than the current money tax assessment, perhaps with the sheriff pocketing the difference.  
When tobacco prices were low (below 10 shillings per 100 pounds) subjects wanted to 
pay their taxes as assessed in tobacco at 100 pounds per 10 shillings tax assessment because they 
would be paying less value in tobacco than what the current money assessment indicated they 
owed. Whereas, the sheriff wanted to assess the tax in current money so as to be given more 
tobacco than 100 pounds per 10 shilling tax assessment in order to make up for the low market 
value of the tobacco. 
Figure 1 shows the current money price of 100 pounds of tobacco. In 1719-1720 tobacco 
prices in current money were well above the 10 shillings per 100 pounds of tobacco. Sure 
enough, the May 25, 1719 petition from “several inhabitants” to the legislature asked that they be 
allowed to pay their taxes in “money”—meaning current money units of account. Similarly, the 
April 8, 1720 petition from “sundry inhabitants” also asked that they be allowed to pay their 
taxes in money. When tobacco prices were closer to the 10 shilling per 100 pounds of tobacco 
legal equivalent, i.e. in 1721, 1722, and 1724, no petitions asking to pay tobacco taxes as 
assessed in current money were submitted to the legislature. In 1723, however, when tobacco 
prices were again above the 10 shilling per 100 pounds of tobacco level, the City of Annapolis 
petitioned the legislature September 28, 1723 for “the Liberty of paying their Levies…” in the 
unit of their choice. All these petitions, or gaming of the tax system, were rejected by the 
legislature (Archives of Maryland, 34, p. 613; Gould, 1915, p. 52).   16
 
Figure 1  Colonial Maryland, 1720-1739: Tobacco Prices and Exports 
 
Notes and Sources: Import numbers are taken from the Historical Statistics (1975, p. 1190). 
Tobacco prices are taken from Earle (1975, pp. 227-228) for Anne Arundel and Prince George’s 
counties, Maryland. They were reported originally in “current money” units. Conversion to 
British Pounds Sterling uses the exchange rates reported in McCusker (1978, pp. 189-202). The 
Sterling-MD Hard is the sterling value of Maryland “current money” units-of-account as 
measured by the commercial bill-of-exchange rate between Maryland and London. This rate 
fluctuated around the “Proclamation Money” par of 1.3333 Maryland pound units-of-account 
being equivalent to one pound sterling. After 1733, “current money” meant Maryland’s paper 
money with the conversion of prices using that exchange rate called Sterling-MD Paper in the 
figure. To ease comparison, all prices are converted to shillings per 100 pounds of tobacco 
(weight). See the text for discussion of the Paper Money to Tobacco Money Tax Payment Legal 
Equivalent and the timing of the Paper Money Act.   17
In 1725, tobacco prices once again rose from just below to substantially above the 10 
shilling current money per 100 pounds of tobacco level. Not surprisingly then, another petition, 
this time from Cecil County on October 11, 1725, came to the legislature. It specifically 
complained that “officers fees are rated in tobacco, and that in scarce years they exact treble the 
value…whereas if officers fees and other public dues were rated in money to be paid at a price 
current in tobacco or wheat it would be reduced to a certainty.” They went on to say that 
“ordinary keepers [sheriffs?] are left to their liberty to charge either in money or tobacco, so that 
when tobacco rises they charge in tobacco and thereby get double the price assessed by the 
justices.”  (Archives of Maryland, 35, pp. 315, 441)  After 1725, when tobacco prices once again 
fell below the 10 shilling current money per 100 pounds of tobacco level, where it stayed until at 
least 1734, petitions stopped coming into the legislature asking to pay tobacco taxes as assessed 
in current money.  
As far as can be told, the legislature, while rejecting petitions by subjects to game the tax 
system through being given the liberty to select in which unit to pay taxes, was sympathetic to, 
and moved to stop, the gaming of the system by the tax collectors (sheriffs). Tax collectors were 
no longer at liberty to price taxes in money or tobacco whichever got them the most value. The 
legislature moved to fix the tax assessment unit by reaffirming that 10 shillings current money in 
taxes was equal to 100 pounds of tobacco and by removing choice over which unit to assess 
value in—making tobacco at the price above the assessment unit unless specifically stated 
otherwise in law. This issue and how the legislatures dealt with it would have considerable 
impact on how Maryland’s paper money system, initiated in 1733, would be structured and 
would subsequently perform.   18
Gould (1915, pp. 52, 70) argued that “The accumulation of these complaints was the 
chief reason for the issue of paper money in 1733.” This seems hard to sustain in that these 
petitions never directly asked for the emission of paper money and only the 1725 Somerset 
County petition asked to pay tobacco taxes in some other medium, i.e. country commodities. 
These petitions mostly concerned fixing the tobacco price of taxes and shifting the barter cost of 
acquiring tobacco onto the tax receiver. Small planters and non-tobacco growers could always 
get tobacco to pay their taxes via barter with larger planters and other tobacco handlers. That 
these small planters and non-tobacco growers bore significant barter transactions costs in so 
obtaining the needed tobacco was likely of little concern to the colony’s elite and large tobacco 
planters or even to the majority of its subjects.  
As long as the colony’s elite and large planters could prevent these small planters and 
non-tobacco growers from shifting the barter transactions cost of the tobacco tax onto them or 
onto the government, they were unlikely to demonetarize tobacco for they saw no benefit of such 
a change. As long as small planters and non-tobacco growers bore the barter transactions cost of 
the tobacco tax, however, they were a constituency that would not oppose the demonetarization 
of tobacco in the colony, particularly if such demonetarization would reduce their barter 
transactions cost in making tax payments. But even as a group, they were not influential enough 
to bring about or catalyze change away from tobacco money and toward a paper money system.  
The first mention of a bill to emit paper money in the Maryland legislature was on 
October 26, 1727, two years after the last petition regarding how tobacco taxes were to be paid 
(discussed above) was submitted to the legislature. The substance of the paper money bill was 
not recorded nor was it acted on (Archives of Maryland, 36, p. 76; Behrens, 1923, p. 12). The 
next paper money bill to show up in the legislature was on October 15, 1728. The substance of   19
this bill stated that it followed from “the present state of the staple [tobacco] of the province and 
the necessity of attempting to improve it… [through] …the proposed reduction of the quantity of 
tobacco to be made…” That “if people should be restrained the liberty of making as much 
tobacco as they can…” they must be given some other medium in which to pay their taxes 
(Archives of Maryland, 36, pp. 116-117; Behrens, 1923, p. 12).  
The emphasis on the troubled state of the tobacco market and the need to reduce the 
quantity produced indicates that some other force was afoot. Requests by non-tobacco growers, 
marginal small-time farmers, and craftsmen to find alternative ways to pay their taxes was not 
enough by itself to lead the colonial government in Maryland to demonetarize tobacco. That does 
not mean they were not an issue. For example, when the Lord Proprietor was finally in the 
province in 1733, the freeholders of Dorchester country on the lower eastern shore directly 
addressed him, reprinted on March 20, 1733 in the American Mercury, pointing out that, “We 
confess, my Lord, that the decay of our trade, the lowness of our staple, and the difficulty of 
barter, have lately occasioned melancholy reflections…” This constituency would support 
change; they were just not strong or important enough by themselves to cause change without the 
support of other constituencies.   
b. Manipulating the Transatlantic Tobacco Market 
  The transatlantic tobacco market experienced frequent and violent fluctuations in price 
and quantity (Gould, 1915, p. 62; Middleton, 1984, pp. 105-147; Price, 1973, pp. 268-301, 376-
410, 509-530, 649-677; Schweitzer, 1980). The war period from 1689 through 1713 had 
restricted markets, raised shipping costs, and depressed production. With the return of peace, 
prospects improved. With the return of French buyers to the British tobacco market, the 
restoration of the French tobacco buying monopoly in 1721-1723, and the British government   20
concession in 1723 to full rebates of tobacco import duties on tobacco re-exported to the 
Continent (to the French), the market not only revived but prospered unlike it had for a 
generation.  
Tobacco prices were relatively high in the late 1710s and early 1720s. This encouraged 
production expansion. This expansion finally caught up to the market with a vengeance in 1727. 
British tobacco imports from the Chesapeake doubled between 1725 and 1727, going from 
approximately 2.1 million pounds in 1725 to 4.2 million pounds in 1727. Even compared to its 
previous high of 3.7 million in 1721, the amount imported in 1727 was still a sizable increase. 
The consequence was a marked fall in tobacco prices in Maryland. Between 1725 and 1727 
tobacco prices fell approximately 25 percent and continued to fall, being 33 percent below their 
1725 level by 1728—see Figure 1.  
  Large tobacco growers and shipping-merchants witnessed these events with alarm. 
Something needed to be done to stabilize and improve their tobacco prospects by raising the 
price of tobacco. Two ideas were current. First, tobacco prices could be raised by somehow 
reducing the quantity of tobacco grown. Maryland tobacco growers certainly felt the rise in 
quantity and fall in price of their staple between 1726 and 1728 and may have come to this 
conclusion both concurrently and independently from that reached by tobacco merchants in 
England. The paper money bill submitted to the Maryland legislature on October 15, 1728 
referred to the “the present state of the staple [tobacco] of the province and the necessity of 
attempting to improve it… [through] …the proposed reduction of the quantity of tobacco to be 
made…” (Archives of Maryland, 36, pp. 116-117; Behrens, 1923, p. 12)  October 15, 1728 was 
before the publication in Maryland of letters from London merchants advocating the same action   21
(see below)—though such sentiments may have been communicated privately among large 
planters and merchants-shippers in Maryland before such was published in the newspaper. 
The second idea was that the low price was the result of the French tobacco buying 
monopoly. This was particularly true for the Oronoco variety which was at this time 
principally/universally grown in Maryland, though substantial quantities were also grown in 
parts of Virginia. Oronoco tobacco was preferred by the French and eschewed by the English 
who preferred sweet-scent. The French purchased a dominant share of the Oronoco tobacco 
imported into England. Because they purchased as a single buyer, they could set or at least 
heavily influence the price they paid, particularly given that they faced numerous competitive 
sellers on the English side of the market. If the English merchant-shippers, with support of the 
large growers in the Chesapeake, could face the French with their own combination monopoly 
on the selling side, they could counteract the French buying monopoly power and force the price 
of tobacco back up (Middleton, 1984, pp. 143-145; Price, 1973, 1995).  
This second idea required not only the cooperation of numerous growers and merchant-
shippers both in the Chesapeake and in England, but presupposed that some effective way to 
reduce tobacco production could be implemented. Without controlling tobacco production it 
would be impossible to maintain voluntary cooperation among those in the sellers’ monopoly. 
The incentives of individual sellers to break the monopoly and deal separately with the French 
would be too great. Better to sell all your tobacco at less than the sellers’ monopoly price than 
risk being stuck with leftover tobacco that could not be sold at all given the high asking price of 
the sellers’ monopoly. 
  Communication and coordination of such a scheme to manipulate the tobacco market 
required transatlantic channels of communication that would disseminate the ideas broadly   22
across the many parties involved. This is where the power of the media enters the story. Before 
1727 there was no newspaper published in Maryland. In 1727, William Parks established the 
Maryland Gazette and published it in Annapolis for eight years, until 1735 (Cook, 1913, pp. 152-
153). During these years it played a critical role in Maryland’s paper money creation story. 
In late 1727 and 1728 a group of tobacco merchants in London met numerous times to 
consider what to do about the low state of the tobacco market and resolved to try and form a 
combination to counter the French monopoly buyer. Communication of this meeting and the 
views and designs of these merchants were communicated to Maryland planters to gain their 
cooperation. On February 4, 1729, the Maryland Gazette published a letter from Henry Darnall, 
who was present at the meetings of the London merchants but was now in Maryland. It was 
addressed to the inhabitants of Maryland describing the London merchants’ concerns and plans. 
On March 4, 1729, the Maryland Gazette also advertised: 
Lately Published 
A Just and Impartial Account of the Transactions of the merchants in London, for the 
Advancement of the Price of TOBACCO. About the latter End of the Year 1727, and 
Beginning of 1728. By Henry Darnall. Who was present at most of them. na Letter from 
Him, to the Inhabitants of Maryland, Dated September 18, 1728. Printed and Sold by W. 
Parks. Pr. 1s. 6d. 
 
On April 15, 1729, a letter from the merchants in London, dated November 7, 1728, was 
published in the Maryland Gazette which described in more detail their concerns, plans, and 
hopes for cooperation (Gould, 1915, p. 70). Within this letter, these London merchants explicitly 
appealed to Marylanders to reduce the quantity of tobacco grown—a necessary pillar to the 
success of any merchant sellers’ monopoly facing the French. But they also recognized that 
doing such would be impossible as long as tobacco served as money within the province, 
particularly with regard to paying local taxes. The London merchants advised that if their scheme 
for reducing tobacco production   23
…would be thought hard, in regard to those that are in debt for tobacco, and yet 
restrained from making enough to pay their debts, the only way we can think of to 
remove that difficulty is to turn all tobacco debts into money debts, and he that makes but 
500lbs of tobacco, may chance to get as much money for it, as will discharge his debt for 
1000lbs of tobacco originally. Indeed, we think it will be the interest of your province, 
that all debts be contracted in money, it is now time to leave off the old way of barter. 
 
  Finally, the London merchants published another letter to the inhabitants of Maryland in 
the Maryland Gazette on June 3, 1729. After again recounting the particular state of the trade and 
steps being taken to deal with it, they also asked cooperation from Maryland planters in not 
drawing bills of exchange on tobacco credits in London too quickly. This request may have been 
due to the efforts by London merchants to affect tobacco prices via the timing of sales to the 
French. In the end, the conspiracy of London tobacco merchants to form an effective sellers’ 
monopoly with which to confront the French buyer’s monopoly fell apart. It was done in, as are 
most monopoly collusion-cartel efforts, by individual merchants breaking ranks and selling 
outside the cartel price and by the inability to control tobacco trading in the English out-ports and 
Scottish ports, both of which undercut the London market pricing conspiracy (Price, 1973, pp. 
651-655).  
The failure of this selling cartel, however, did not lessen the relevance of the idea that if 
the quantity of tobacco could be reduced in the Chesapeake, that could still restore tobacco 
prices, avert the crisis in the tobacco industry, and so return the province to prosperity. It was 
even extolled in poetry. In the Maryland Gazette on December 30, 1729, and reprinted in the 
American Weekly Mercury on January 14, 1730 and in the Pennsylvania Gazette on January 13, 
1730, was a long poem send to Mr. Samuel Hasting, a shipwright of Philadelphia, on the 
occasion of his launching of a merchant ship built in Annapolis. The poem ended with:  
Yet if my sons have courage left to thrive, 
If they their sinking staple would revive; 
Let the strictest bonds some merchant’s faith secure   24
Whom from their native land they may procure; 
For few, alas! Are found to keep their trust, 
Unless their interest binds them to be just: 
… 
Let such who have the fortunes to be free, 
Refuse to send their crops across the sea; 
Let them in other works employ their hands, 
Nor with tobacco vex their fertile lands; 
‘Till they’ve enjoyed a rest of one short year, 
Then trade shall in a richer dress appear, 
And with a higher price reward the Planter’s care. 
 
c. Whose Tobacco Production Should Be Cut? 
  Any cartel of colluding producers out to reduce output and so raise prices must decide on 
two things: First, whose output is to be cut, and second, how should those producers be 
compensated. Reducing the amount of tobacco grown and exported from Maryland was no 
different. An across-the-board percentage reduction in tobacco output by all producers would be 
the simplest to design. Each producer would then be compensated, more-or-less fairly across all 
producers, by the higher price earned on his/her remaining output. Such a design, however, 
would be highly inefficient—yielding relatively small profits for the province as a whole. To 
maximize producer profits as a group and so maximize the gains to the colony as a whole, the 
tobacco output of the least cost-efficient producers should be cut first. The most cost-efficient 
producers should not cut output at all. This design would maximize the gap between cost and 
price for the province as a whole.  
  The most efficient tobacco producers were relatively large planters who specialized in 
tobacco growing, who cured and prized their own tobacco, and often shipped on consignment. 
They enjoyed economies of scale and lower transactions costs compared with small growers. The 
least efficient tobacco producers were typically the small growers and farmers who produced just 
enough tobacco to directly pay their tobacco taxes—typically under a hogshead or two of   25
tobacco who typically did not prize their own tobacco but had to sell it loose in “hands.” If large 
planters could get the small growers to bear all the tobacco output reduction, then the large 
planters would reap all the gains from the expected increase in the price of tobacco. Small 
growers, however, would not go along with this design unless they were compensated for their 
output reduction. The problem was how to design a way for the large planters to compensate the 
small growers for agreeing to this tobacco output reduction scheme.  
  Many small tobacco growers were planting just enough tobacco to meet their tobacco 
taxes because the barter transactions cost of acquiring tobacco in trade was higher. Thus, to get 
small growers to opt in to such a tobacco reduction scheme, they would have to be compensated 
by being offered a way to pay their taxes other than with tobacco that was less costly than trading 
for the tobacco needed, and was more cost-efficient for the small grower than growing the 
tobacco itself. Since such compensation was tied to the province’s tax structure, legislative 
action by the Maryland government would have to be involved in such a planter tobacco output 
reduction scheme. 
  Enter the provincial government and the Lord Proprietor. Tobacco taxes paid by small 
growers and non-tobacco growers were troublesome. Typically a farmer would use his worst 
tobacco or trashy tobacco to pay his taxes and sell the rest. Small growers who grew only enough 
to pay their tobacco taxes were also inefficient producers and so may have only produced trash 
tobacco. The transactions cost of tobacco tax collection, storage, and resale to those who would 
prize and ship it was not insignificant. This state of affairs lowered the value of the government’s 
and the Proprietor’s potential tax take, and the amount of trash tobacco in the market (in a world 
before inspection grading) lowered all tobacco prices.
4  Small growers, besides being inefficient 
growers cost-wise, were likely to be the source of relatively more of the trash tobacco. Thus, if   26
the provincial legislature and Proprietor could find some other way for these small growers to 
pay their taxes other than with tobacco, that would be nominally equivalent but easier to collect 
cost-wise, they would come out ahead. If they could get the large planter to pay for this other 
method, that would be even better. Finally, eliminating some portion of trash tobacco from the 
market would also benefit the large growers. Not only would the average price of tobacco rise 
because the average quality of tobacco in the market was higher, but the price on high quality 
tobacco would rise even more because the buyer’s risk compensation discount for the possibility 
of being stuck with trashy tobacco mixed in with the high quality was reduced. 
  Such interests can be seen in a letter addressed to the lower house of the Maryland 
legislature by the Proprietor, Lord Baltimore, on September 25, 1723 where he remarked,  
…and am pleased with the occasion you thereby give me in this Public Manner of 
Declaring how Acceptable Any thing is to me which you Apprehend may prove 
Advantageous to the Staple of Our Country. 
The great Quantity of Bad Tobacco lately given up to be burnt, whereby his 
Majesty has been so Considerable a Loser in his Customs Caused much Inquiry and 
Speculation, Until the Sight of your late Act…gave hopes that the like would not happen 
for the future which has Convinced me how much it is for your Advantage that I should 
be Assisted with men of knowledge and Interest in your Affairs in Order Either to 
preserve those privileges you now Enjoy, or in Obtaining Others as Occasion may offer 
(Archives of Maryland, 34, p. 601). 
 
Thus the three major political constituents, the large tobacco planters, the non-tobacco 
and small tobacco growers, and the provincial government/Proprietor, were ripe for consensus on 
a paper money scheme as long as it achieved the following: 1) a reduction in the overall quantity 
of tobacco grown, 2) that reduction to come disproportionately from the output of trashy tobacco 
by small growers which was mostly used to pay taxes, 3) that small growers and non-tobacco 
growers be compensated by being given some less costly way to pay a given tax assessment than 
in tobacco, and 4) that large tobacco growers largely pay for this compensation out of their 
market gains from the output reduction scheme. The key to the creation of a paper money   27
economy was replacing tobacco for the payment of taxes, especially among the small growers 
and non-tobacco growers. But that role was ancillary to the main purpose, which was the 
reduction of tobacco output, especially the amount of trash tobacco in the market.  
Achieving a consensus on how to do this was not easy. As late as 1732, the legislative 
upper house in an address to Maryland Governor Samuel Ogle remarked that, “And, 
notwithstanding the disappointments, we have heretofore met with in our endeavors to raise the 
value of our staple, we are not without hopes that some expedient may yet be found to effect it.” 
They also mentioned the problem of extra-legal actions taken by some to destroy tobacco and the 
need for a paper currency (reprinted in the American Weekly Mercury, July 27, 1732). 
The Evolution of Maryland’s Initial Paper Money Bill, 1727-1733 
  Efforts to enact a paper money bill finally came to fruition in the spring of 1733 when 
“An Act for Emitting and Making Current Ninety Thousand Pounds Current Money of Maryland 
in Bills of Credit” was passed. The preamble to the act stated: 
Whereas tobacco, the only staple of this province, and the principal dependence of 
its inhabitants, hath for several years past produced so little, that several of the people, 
not able to get the necessaries of life, by the fruits of their labor, have been obliged to 
desert their habitations…or be constrained to attempt some other way of living, less 
advantageous…than making tobacco… 
And whereas, the most probable means to enable the people to discharge their 
taxes, and other engagements now payable in tobacco, otherwise, and to destroy such 
ordinary and unmerchantable tobaccos, which serve only to clog the markets, and to 
depreciate the best sorts of that commodity, as well as to put the people in a condition to 
carry on the tobacco trade, to the advantage of Great Britain, and this Province, is to 
establish a paper currency, or bills of credit, upon a sinking fund: (Archives of Maryland, 
v. 39, p. 92; Behrens, 1923, pp. 18-19).  
 
An example of the actual bills of credit or paper currency issued is reproduced in Figure 2.  
Paper money bills had been proposed but not enacted in 1727, 1728, 1729, 1730, 1731, 
and 1732. Some of the details and differences in these bills and why they failed to get enacted 




Figure 2  Maryland Bill of Credit (Paper Money): Initial Emission 1733 
 
Source: Newman (1997, p. 164). 
 
 
known about the 1727 bill other than such a bill existed. Some of the differences were seemingly 
uncontroversial, such as the 1728, 1729, and 1730 bills authorized the emission of 24,000 
Maryland pounds, whereas the 1731 bill increased the authorization to 36,000, the 1732 bill to 
72,000, and the final 1733 bill to 90,000 Maryland pounds. As shown in Table 1, even the 
90,000 amount was not excessive on a per capita sterling equivalent basis relative to that of other 
colonies. In addition, changes in the particular mechanics of the bill, e.g. how the sinking-fund 
would be filled and how the bills would be distributed, also seem to be somewhat 
uncontroversial. These issues do not appear to be the reasons why passage was delayed from 
1727 until 1733. Behrens (1923, p. 18) simply says that “When the assembly met in 1733 the 
Lord Proprietor was himself present in the Province, and a spirit of good feeling and conciliation 
was prevalent among the classes and between him and his tenants.”  
  The core substance and consensus part of the bills—expressed in the preamble to the 
1733 bill quoted above—can be found in every bill going back to 1728. Namely, paper money   29
emissions were inexorably intertwined with control of the tobacco market and they were to be a 
direct agent or vehicle for reducing tobacco output. In fact, more was often written on controlling 
the tobacco market in these bills than on the mechanics of creating a paper money economy. For 
example, the 1731 bill had the same payment-per-taxable clause for destroying trashy tobacco as 
the 1733 final bill, namely a rate of 15 shillings paid in paper money per 150 pounds of trashy 
tobacco destroyed. Finally, all variations of the bill from 1728 to 1733 contained some sinking 
fund provision for supporting the value of the paper money (Archives of Maryland, v. 36, 37, 
39). 
  The points of disagreement that held up the passage between 1727 and 1733 dealt mostly 
with disagreements over political prerogatives and rents seeking (distribution of the costs and 
benefits among the various constituencies). The first political prerogative issue was over whether 
Maryland’s legislative lower house would consent to the Proprietor’s right to assent or dissent to 
the passage of their bills—an age-old struggle going on in most colonies in this era. It took a 
short while for the lower house to finally relent to the Proprietor’s right. The second was over 
whether the upper or lower house had the right to appoint the commissioners and officer holders 
listed in the Paper Money Act responsible for carrying out the Act. These issues of political 
prerogatives were resolved by the time the final bill was passed in 1733 (Archives of Maryland, 
v. 37, pp. 503-504; Behrens, 1923, pp. 12-18). They are largely unimportant to the economic 
design and performance of Maryland’s paper money economy. 
  Throughout the process and sequence of bills from 1727 to the final bill in 1733, paper 
money was set equal to current money with 10 shillings current money then also set equal to 100 
pounds of tobacco for tax assessment purposes (as it had been before a paper money was 
considered). This meant that depending on whether the price of tobacco in the marketplace was   30
expected to stay below the 10 shillings per 100 pounds or rise above it (see Figure 1) affected 
whether effective tax bills, and income earnings for those whose income was taken directly from 
tax payments, would be expected to be relatively higher or lower under the paper money scheme 
compared with before the scheme was adopted. If the scheme to reduce tobacco output was 
expected to push the price of tobacco above the 10 shilling per 100 pounds level, then taxpayers 
would want to pay their taxes in paper money rather than tobacco whereas those who directly 
received tax receipts as income wanted the taxes to be paid in tobacco, and vice versa if the 
scheme was not expected to push the price of tobacco above the 10 shilling per 100 pounds level. 
This condition set up considerable conflict between the three constituencies, the lower house, the 
upper house, and the Proprietor/government, over what taxes could and could not be paid with 
paper money and whether for taxes that could be paid in paper money choice would be granted 
to pay in tobacco instead (Archives of Maryland, v. 36, 37, 39; Behrens, 1923, pp. 12-26).  
The outcome of these iterative negotiations was a final bill in 1733 that had a complex set 
of legal tender clauses with numerous exemptions and conditional choices. Paper money was to 
be a legal tender for all contracts for current money in the province after the passage of the act. It 
is important to note here the use of the term “for current money.” As such, the legal tender clause 
did not interfere with or affect contracts written for payments in specie or sterling (Archives of 
Maryland, v. 39, pp. 92-113).  
All provincial public charges—all levies, lawyers’ fees, bounties, rewards, allowances, 
fines, forfeitures, penalties, rates, duties, and impositions assessed in tobacco—could now be 
paid in paper money, “Provided always, that no person shall be obliged to pay the said bills of 
credit…in lieu of tobacco; but that every person shall be at liberty to pay for the said levies, fees, 
penalties, as if this act had never been made.” Again, it is important to note that choice of   31
payment medium (paper money or tobacco) was granted. However, if said levies and lawyers’ 
fee were not paid in paper money by the 10
th day of April of that year, they could be required to 
be paid “in tobacco, as if this act had never been made…” Choice and constrained choice gave 
an opening for the tax system to be gamed by rent-seeking parties seeking the better payout—
tobacco or paper money. Finally, certain public charges were excluded from the legal tender 
clause and so could be demanded by the receiving party to be paid in tobacco or specie rather 
than paid in paper money. The principal exceptions were for the 40-shilling ecclesiastical poll 
tax, duties on tobacco exports and ship tonnage, and all other non-penal-fine monies payable to 
the Lord Proprietor. Basically a complex dual currency of paper money and tobacco “money” 
was maintained. This would plague the economy and in part undermine the performance of 
Maryland’s paper money (Archives of Maryland, v. 39, pp. 92-113; Behrens, 1923, pp. 12-26). 
The Press Media and the Evolution of the Paper Money Bill 
  As the paper money bills seemed to constantly fail to finish their way to final enactment 
in each year from 1727 through 1732, and especially seemed to be languishing from inactivity in 
1729, the press media weighed in to offer information that may have been influential in coaxing 
the process forward and shaping its content. For example, in 1728-1729 Pennsylvania was in the 
middle of its own debate over whether to re-emit paper money. On May 27, 1729 the Maryland 
Gazette published a speech by Pennsylvania Governor Patrick Gordon to the freemen of 
Pennsylvania where Gordon said, “I have openly declared myself a friend to our paper currency, 
and am desirous to promote an Addition to it, in such a manner as I can account for to his 
majesty, and my superiors.” On June 10, 1729 the Maryland Gazette reprinted another speech by 
Gordon where he reiterated “…that no man in the province is more truly and sincerely a friend to 
this currency than I am,” and that “I am now to pass the bill agreed on by us for the emission of   32
thirty thousand pounds more of a paper currency.” This example of Pennsylvania and especially 
the support and role played by the colony’s governor may have influenced the reconciliation in 
Maryland toward a paper money bill, especially during 1730 to 1732 regarding both conflicts 
over political prerogatives and balancing the gains across constituencies (Behrens, 1923, pp. 16-
18). 
  On the other side, however, the Maryland Gazette on October 28, 1729 also published 
(reprinted) an address by New Jersey Governor W. Burnet to his house of representatives saying, 
“But it would be well for you to remember, who made this province, that was once flourishing, 
to decline so much; even they, who have ruined the credit of it, by making a deluge of paper 
currency…” Paper money acts were not without their pitfalls. Care needed to be taken in 
devising them so as to support the paper currency’s value. Taking the time to get it right perhaps 
was not so bad. 
 The  Maryland Gazette on July 22, 1729 also published (re-published) Benjamin 
Franklin’s A Modest Enquiry into the Nature and Necessity of a Paper-Currency. Franklin’s 
pamphlet was a brilliant tour de force that effectively carried the day in the Pennsylvania paper 
money debate by extolling the benefits of a paper currency to the economy. It also debunked the 
arguments against a paper currency by the wealthy—showing that they were narrow and self-
serving and detrimental to the common man and the province as a whole. In particular, Franklin 
championed a land-bank-mortgage method for emitting paper money as an important stabilizing 
structure to controlling paper money’s value (Grubb, 2006, pp. 3-4; Labaree, 1959. v. 1, pp. 139-
157; Lemay, 2006, pp. 397-413).  
Interestingly, the Maryland paper money bills made no mention of a land-bank-mortgage 
method for emitting and redeeming paper money until after Franklin’s essay was published.   33
Even through 1731, the only redemption method outside of paying taxes was the creation of a 
sinking fund. However, by 1732, with the formation of a joint committee of leading men of both 
houses and agents for the Proprietor composed of men like Daniel Dulany, who were cut from 
the same cloth as Franklin, did things change. The 1732 bill, while structurally the same as 
before, added a land-bank-mortgage component to the issue-redemption design of Maryland’s 
paper money. This also probably explains the doubling of the nominal size of the authorized 
emission from 36,000 in the 1731 bill to 72,000 in the 1732 bill. The sinking fund component 
was also downplayed as a value-controlling factor—making it a conditional aid if it could be 
enacted. A land-bank-mortgage component of the paper money bill would be retained in the final 
1733 bill passed (Archives of Maryland, v. 37, pp. 406-408; v. 39, pp. 92-113; Behrens, 1923, p. 
16-18). Debates in the press over the particulars of how the money should be distributed and 
redeemed were also offered in the Maryland Gazette on July 15, 1729 where “P.Q.” advocated a 
distribution of 10 shilling to each taxable in the province through the county sheriff—a variant of 
which found its way into the final 1733 bill but at a higher sum.   
  Finally, William Parks, publisher of the Maryland Gazette, also published a pamphlet in 
Annapolis in 1730 by Ebenezer Cook called Sotwed Redivivus or the Planters Looking-Glass in 
Burlesque Verse. In this lengthy poem, Cook appears to mock planters who opposed the paper 
money bill in Maryland—some of the relevant portions are (Cook, 1900, pp. 39-50): 
  ...As shall in proper place be shewn; 
Reduced to penury indeed, 
By feeding on this Indian weed. 
For remedy, both houses join, 
To settle here a current coin, 
Without exception, such as may, 
Our public dues and clergy pay. 
Grown worldly wise, unwilling are 
… 
[To] Hold Predial Tythes, secure in bags,   34
 Better  than  paper made of rags: 
 The  Scribes likewise, and Pharisees, 
  Infected with the same disease, 
 On  paper money look a squint, 
  Care not to be made fools in print. 
  Thus what is meant for public good, 
  I find misunderstood, 
  And taken in the worser sense, 
  By those, care not for paper pence. 
  And tho’ this scheme should prove in vain, 
  The case to me seems very plain; 
  Said I to planter standing by,  
  And was for paper currency: 
  It’s money, be it what it will, 
  In tan-pit coin’d, or paper-mill, 
  That must the hungry belly fill, 
  When summon’d to attend the Court, 
  Held at the magisterial port. 
… 
The leveling a standing coin, 
It matters not what sort of mine 
It issues from, since every thing 
Is worth no more than it will bring. 
… 
To know the meaning of such clamor; 
Says one, in drink, that made him stammer, 
The reason’s this, if you must know it, 
The house divided is, old poet, 
In voting for the money bill; 
Which, tho’ composed with wondrous skill, 
Will never pass, I dare be bold, 
A pipe of wine on it to hold. 
… 
His wise remarks began to make, 
On the new plan for raising pence, 
Protesting, tho’ it was the sense 
Of some, that sat in the wise * mote, 
He could not safely give his vote, 
For such an odd contrived intention, 
As ever was laid before convention: 
Alleging, planters, when in drink, 
Would light their pipes with paper chink; 
And knowing not to read, might be 
Imposed on, by such currency. 
These reasons, laughter did create; 
The subject was of our debate;   35
… 
So gravely fell to argument; 
On the late act of parliament; 
The growth of sotweed to prevent, 
And give our staple freer vent. 
… 
The only way I know to heal 
The lingering state of common-weal, 
Is to ordain all taxes be, 
As well the priest, as lawyer’s fee, 
Hereafter paid in currency; 
Or with the produce of our grounds, 
In stinkbus too much abounds; 
Else, ‘tis in vain for us to hope, 
With our misfortunes long to cope. 
 
What impact this had on the evolution and final consensus over a paper money bill is hard to say. 
But serious opposition seemed to have largely melted away between 1730 and the final 1733 bill 
hooray (Behrens, 1923, pp. 16-18). 
  The Perceived Distribution of Costs and Benefits in the Final 1733 Bill 
Why did all three constituencies believe at this point that they would be net gainers with 
this bill? Why did they all finally opt in? What could have been their expectations?  
a. Small and Marginal Tobacco Growers  
Small farmers (represented mostly by the lower legislative house) would get, along with 
all other masters, 30 shillings of paper money per taxable under their control. In exchange, they 
had to destroy 300 pounds of tobacco per taxable (150 on or before the last day of July 1734 and 
150 on or before the last day of July 1735). Thus, they were given the same rate as the 10 
shillings per 100 pounds of tobacco tax assessment equivalent. If the tobacco was not destroyed 
then a fine of 20 shillings was assessed (Archives of Maryland, v. 39, pp. 110-111; Behrens, 
1923, p. 21). These farmers could use the paper money given to them to pay most all taxes, fees, 
etc. Assuming that many of these small marginal farmers were only growing enough tobacco to   36
pay the taxes which had to be paid in tobacco, these small growers gained savings on the barter 
transactions costs of paying taxes in tobacco versus currency. They could give up doing what 
they were relatively inefficient at and switch into more profitable crops instead. 
This gain would be enhanced if they expected that the tobacco output reduction scheme 
would not successfully drive the price of tobacco back up over the 10 shillings per 100 pounds 
tax assessment equivalent level. Figure 1 shows that the price had been well below that level for 
the prior six years. Tobacco output reduction in Maryland could be offset by output expansion in 
Virginia and North Carolina or simply by expansion by greedy large growers in Maryland. The 
choice-clause for paying taxes in the Act meant that small growers could still pay their taxes in 
the tobacco which they had remaining post-destruction and hoard their higher-valued paper 
money as long as tobacco prices stayed below the 10 shillings per 100 pounds of tobacco tax 
assessment level.  
This thinking may have also lead the lower house to insist on exempting the 40-shilling 
ecclesiastical poll tax from payment in paper money. The lower house did not like paying this 
tax to churchmen and had tried to get rid of it before, but without success. With the Paper Money 
Act, the lower house could substantially lower the income (taxes) paid to these churchmen by 
insisting that they be paid in tobacco rather than paper money, given that 100 pounds of tobacco 
was worth far less that 10 shilling current money at that time, see Figure 1. When the price of 
tobacco rose above that level after 1734, and the lower house complained that this ecclesiastical 
poll tax paid in tobacco was now, in value, above its 10 shillings of money equivalent, the 
governor reminded them that they were the ones who initially sought the exemption of this tax 
from being paid in paper money (Behrens, 1923, pp. 18-19).    37
Finally, for small growers who were basically moving out of producing tobacco, they 
bore no direct cost of this act given that the sinking fund to support the paper currency was to 
come from a tax of 15d sterling on every hogshead of tobacco exported. Larger growers had to 
pay that. The 1731 version of the bill had targeted the importation of slaves, Irish servants, and 
liquor for a tax to fill the sinking fund (Archives of Maryland, v. 37, p. 344). This funding 
method would have fallen more heavily on small growers and non-tobacco producers than on 
larger tobacco producers compared with the scheme adopted in the final 1733 bill. What debate 
took place between 1731 and 1733 that changed this method of filling the sinking fund is hard to 
say. But whatever it was small farmers and non-tobacco growers gained by this change. 
b. Large Tobacco Growers 
The large tobacco planters (mostly represented in the legislative upper house) gained a 
large reduction in the amount of tobacco in the market, disproportionately bore by small growers. 
They believed this output reduction would push up the price of tobacco on their remaining 
stocks, and push it up enough to more than compensate for any cost to them of paying for this 
scheme. This belief was manifested in numerous places. For example, on October 15, 1728 the 
legislature explicitly referred to the trade-off between a forced-reduction in the quantity of 
tobacco grown in Maryland and the advancement in its price (Archives of Maryland, v. 36, p. 
117). The preambles to the paper money bills from 1728-1733 and the legislative debate over 
these issues made the same connection, e.g. see Archives of Maryland (v. 36, p. 253; v. 37, pp. 
75, 338; v. 39, p. 92). This quantity-price connection for Maryland tobacco was also made in 
merchant letters, e.g. see the London merchant’s letter of November 7, 1728 published in the 
Maryland Gazette April 15, 1729 quoted above.    38
What large tobacco planters had to give up in exchange for this expected price rise was a 
tax of 15d sterling per every hogshead of tobacco exported to fund the paper money scheme 
through a the sinking fund.
5  They must have expected the price of tobacco to rise more than this 
tax—which it did though not due to the reduction in the quantity of Maryland tobacco. 15d per 
hogshead is £0.063 per hogshead. An average hogshead in the 1730s was 856 pounds of tobacco 
(Historical Statistics of the United States, 2006, p. 5-684). Thus, the tax was £0.007 per 100 
pounds of tobacco exported or 0.14 shillings per 100 pounds of tobacco exported. The market 
price advanced 3 to 4 shillings per 100 pounds of tobacco between 1730 and 1734, see Figure 1. 
Large planters viewed this as a good tradeoff—even if the causal logic was erroneous. 
c. The Lord Proprietor and the Maryland Government 
  In the final 1733 bill, the provincial government set aside 11 to 12 percent of the total 
amount of paper money authorized for its use to finance building projects. In addition, as much 
as £20,000 to £30,000 would be available to loan out at 4 percent interest, which would generate 
an income for the government. These sums that the provincial government would have use of 
represented the increases in the amounts authorized in the 1733 bill over those in the earlier 
1730, 1731, and even 1732 versions of the bill. The government also expected to gain some from 
the reduced barter transactions cost of tax collection—at least for some taxes. Finally, the Lord 
Proprietor was able to protect himself from the risks of being paid in paper money by exempting 
most of his earning and rents from payment in paper money. If the scheme was successful in 
raising the price of tobacco above 10 shilling per 100 pounds or if paper money depreciated, he 
would come out ahead.  
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The Effect on the Tobacco Market of the 1733 Paper Money Act 
  The performance of Maryland’s paper money was inexorably intertwined with how it 
directly affected tobacco production and prices and how the general performance of the tobacco 
market in turn affected paper money usage. Three hundred pounds of tobacco was to be 
destroyed over a two year period (half in 1734 and half in 1735) for every 30 shillings of paper 
money handed out. By 1735 some 48,000 Maryland paper pounds had been handed out for this 
purpose (see Table 3 below). In other words, 4.8 million pounds of tobacco was to be destroyed 
in 1734 and again in 1735 (48,000 Maryland paper pounds * 20/30 shillings *150 pounds of 
tobacco * 2 years = 9.6 million pounds of tobacco for 1734 plus 1735 destroyed).  
Was it actually destroyed? Behrens (1923, p. 22) claims that “the £48,000 thus spent was 
practically wasted as it did not improve the tobacco trade. Trash tobacco continued to be put 
upon the market…” While tobacco production numbers just for Maryland do not exist, a sense of 
the change in tobacco exports can be estimated from the sinking-fund evidence. Marylanders 
were to pay 15d (sterling) for every hogshead of tobacco exported. This money was to be sent to 
England to be invested in Bank of England stock. Evidence for the face value of this stock can be 
taken from Price (1977) and Smith (1985, pp. 1,205-1,206). Converting the face value of that 
stock in the sinking fund back to sterling market value can be used to back out the amount of 
tobacco that must have been exported to generate this tax revenue, see Table 2. It will be 
assumed that it took two years to go from production to when tax revenue showed up as stock in 
the sinking fund. The estimate depends on whether the actual average weight or the legal-rated 
weight of a hogshead is used in the estimate. The legal weight seems to get a more reasonable 
estimate. While the level of implied tobacco exports from Maryland may be off for a number of 
reasons, the yearly direction of change in exports should nevertheless be a reasonable estimate.
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By this estimate tobacco exports from Maryland took a sizable dip in the years just following 
1734-1735, the period of tobacco destruction. Based on the last estimate in Table 2, annual 
tobacco exports fell by 43 percent (were 10 million pounds lower) in 1736-1737 from what they 
were in 1734-1735. They then returned to 1734-1735 levels by the end of the 1730s. The 
magnitudes of the change, however, do not square exactly with the estimate above of the amount 
destroyed. So the scale in Table 2 cannot be relied on, only the sense of the direction of change 
can safely be used—and that was clearly to reduce exports for at least two years. 
Table 2  Estimates of Tobacco Exports from Maryland, 1735-1739 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  Face Value  Bank of   Market   Implied   Implied  Percentage 
  Of the    England  Value of  Tobacco  Tobacco  of all 
Sinking Share     of  Sinking  Exports per  Exports per  Chesapeake 
  Fund in   Price    Fund in  Year in lbs.   Year in lbs.  Tobacco 
 Pounds   in  Pounds  Pounds   [∆VFi – 2 [ ∆VFi – 2 Imported  to 
  Sterling      Sterling     Sterling *  16   *16   England  (the 
Year  [F]      *  [SP]     =  [VF]    * 856]   * 400]   last estimate) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1734          40,841,472  19,084,800    54.2%    
1735          39,074,688  18,259,200    45.9 
1736    2,000     *  1.4045    =    2,982   [17,613,056]   [8,230,400]   21.8 
1737    4,000     *  1.4588    =    5,835   [17,613,056]   [8,230,400]   16.5 
1738              [7,121]   29,172,480  13,632,000   34.2 
1739    6,000     *  1.4012    =    8,407    38,540,544  18,009,600   39.3 
1740    7,500     *  1.4049    =  10,537 
1741    9,500     *  1.4054    =  13,351 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes and Sources: Brackets indicate interpolated values. The source for [SP] is Mirowski (1981, 
pp. 569-570); for [F] is Price (1977) and Smith (1985, pp. 1,204-1,205). Tobacco exports were 
taxed at 15d sterling per hogshead to be supplied to [VF]. Assuming production took two years 
before being realized as a value in the sinking fund gets [∆VFi - 2]. 240d/15d = 16 converts 
pounds sterling into pence and then determines how many hogsheads must have been taxed at 
15d to get [∆VF]. Multiplying by 856 converts average hogshead weight into lbs of tobacco, see 
Historical Statistics of the United States (2006, pp. 5-684). The law, however, rated hogsheads at 
400 pounds each for tax purposes (Archives of Maryland, v. 39, p. 105). Total tobacco imports to 
England from the Chesapeake (Virginia and Maryland) are taken from Historical Statistics of the 
United States (1975, p. 1190). 
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  In addition, tobacco prices in Maryland were considerably higher in the period from 1734 
through 1739 compared with 1728 through 1732, about 50 to 60 percent higher in current 
money, see Figure 1. Re-inflating the price of tobacco was the hallmark of success given the 
intention of the Paper Money Act. In fact, by 1734 the price of tobacco was for the first time 
since 1726 above the 10 shillings current money per 100 pounds of tobacco tax assessment level. 
This fact will be important below to understanding the performance of the paper money 
economy. The upward trend in tobacco prices, however, began in 1732 before the tobacco 
destruction would have had any effect. So it may be hard to ascribe the price rise solely to the 
impact of the 1733 Paper Money Act. 
  In addition, looking at the quantity of tobacco imported to England from the entire 
Chesapeake (both Virginia and Maryland) over this period, see Figure 1, it is hard to see any 
discernable impact. Between 1729 and 1736, the trend looks flat then it rises after 1736. The 
steepest reduction is in 1732 well before the Paper Money Act could have had any effect. The 
flat trend also makes the rise in price in Maryland seem puzzling.  
  The answer, while still somewhat speculative, would appear to be that any reduction of 
Maryland tobacco production in the mid-1730s was offset by expansion of Virginia tobacco 
production such that total tobacco imports to England stayed more or less constant. Now “all 
tobacco imports” included both sweet-scent which was not grown in Maryland and Oronoco 
which was grown exclusively in Maryland but also in substantial quantities in parts of Virginia. 
Whether the Virginia output expansion speculated above was in sweet-scent or Oronoco is 
unknown. If it was only in sweet-scent, then a net reduction in the Oronoco variety could account 
for the rise in price seen in Maryland tobacco after 1732.   42
  Another factor, however, may have dominated this market in a way that explains why 
prices increased even with a flat trend in supply. That was the expansion of French demand in 
this period. Annual French tobacco purchases in the British tobacco market increased 57 percent 
between 1724-1729 and 1730-1736 and increased another 50 percent between 1730-1736 and 
1737-1743 (Price, 1973, p. 380). This was all principally in Oronoco tobacco. French demand 
represented about a quarter of all British re-exports of tobacco imported from the Chesapeake 
(Middleton, 1984, p. 124; Price, 1995, II, p. 509). This substantial increase in French purchases 
(demand) in the face of a relatively flat trend in tobacco production led to the 50 to 60 percent 
rise in Maryland tobacco prices shown in Figure 1. It also explains why that rise in price started 
before the Paper Money Act was passed and the tobacco destruction part of the Act 
implemented. That the rise in French demand swamped the other effects in the market can be 
seen in the movement in Virginia tobacco prices. In all sub-regions of Virginia, for both sweet-
scent and Oronoco, tobacco prices in Virginia currency rose substantially between 1728-1732 
and 1733-1739—at least a 33 percent rise on average (Historical Statistics of the United States, 
2006, p. 5-682).  
  The political debates in Maryland over whether to exempt what taxes from payment in 
paper money and require payment in tobacco can be understood in terms of what was expected to 
happen to tobacco prices as a result of the Paper Money Act. Some Marylanders may have 
considered French demand for their Oronoco tobacco to be highly elastic, despite the French 
being a buying monopoly, because the French could easily shift to Virginia Oronoco tobacco if 
Marylanders reduced their output and/or tried to raise their price. In this case, the Paper Money 
Act, even if it destroyed a lot of tobacco, would not raise the price from where it was circa 1730 
well below the 10 shilling per 100 pounds of tobacco tax equivalent level. For these   43
Marylanders, they would have wanted to maintain the option at least to pay taxes in tobacco 
rather than in money, as they expected tobacco to be of less value. They also would want groups 
who received taxes, such as the clergy, whom they did not like to be required to continue to take 
their income in tobacco rather than money. 
  Alternatively, some Marylanders may have thought that French demand for their 
Oronoco tobacco was less elastic. A reduction in Maryland output would drive up the price. This 
could have been a reasonable expectation given that Virginia in 1730 had enacted a tobacco 
inspection system that could have inhibited their ability to expand production to compensate for 
any constriction in output achieved in Maryland (Middleton, 1984, pp. 132, 135-137). Under 
such a case, the price of tobacco in Maryland might be expected to rise, and rise above the 10 
shilling per 100 pounds of tobacco tax assessment level, as a result of the 1733 Paper Money 
Act. These Marylanders would want to pay their taxes in money rather than tobacco, and those 
who received income tax receipts would want to receive tax income in tobacco rather than 
money.  
  These differing expectations and assumptions about the likely elasticity of French 
demand for Maryland Oronoco tobacco may explain some of the rather strange patchwork of 
exemptions and conditional exceptions to paying taxes in paper money versus tobacco “money” 
in the final 1733 Paper Money Act. In the end, the elasticity of French demand may not have 
mattered much as all groups may have unanticipated the net expansion in French demand. That 
expansion swamped everything and drove the price up. The resulting higher price of tobacco 
after 1733 and the patchwork of exemptions to paying taxes in paper money would be 
devastating to the performance of Maryland’s paper pound during its first decade. 
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The Performance of Maryland’s Paper Money, 1734-1739 
  Table 3 reports the amounts of Maryland paper pounds outstanding and by what method 
they were emitted. Of the £90,000 authorized in the 1733 Act, £48,000 was distributed to the 
taxables of the province. This distribution appears to have mostly taken place in 1734 and 1735, 
though some may have waited until 1736 or 1737 to get into the hands of those designed to 
receive them (Gould, 1915, pp. 85-86). This was the distribution in exchange for burning 300 
pounds of tobacco for each 30 shillings of paper money received. Some expenses of government 
were paid in paper money in 1735-1737, and several government building projects were to be 
funded with paper money in this period, with these government expenses totaling somewhere 
around 12,000 Maryland paper pounds. The rest, almost £20,000 by 1739 was loaned out to 
subjects of the province at 4 percent interest with the subject’s land or silver plate pledged as 
security. By 1739, £80,000 of the £90,000 authorized had been emitted and was in circulation in 
the economy. 
  Maryland’s paper money began to lose its value almost immediately after it was issued 
(distributed) within the province. Bills of exchange written in Maryland on sterling accounts in 
England more or less held their value at par to Maryland pounds units of account. But bills 
expressed in Maryland paper pounds lost their value quickly; see Figure 3. While the actual data 
points, or number of observations, are rather few, being only seven between 1734 and 1740, this 
quantitative data accords with the impressions given in the literary evidence from the period 
(Behrens, 1923, p. 22-23; Gould, 1915, pp. 87-89). With par being 133 Maryland paper pounds 
to 100 pounds sterling, the Maryland paper pound depreciated to around 150 to 100 pounds 
sterling in 1734-1735, and then to around 230 to 100 pounds sterling by 1736 through 1739—  45
with a lot of variance around these approximate averages, see Figure 3 (McCusker, 1978, pp. 
189-204). Why did the value collapse so quickly and why so far? 
Table 3  Maryland Paper Pounds (bills of credit) in Circulation 1734-1739 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Bills  Distributed       Annual    
  Total Maryland  to the Taxables  Bill on   Charges   
  Paper Pounds    of the Province  Loan Still  of     
Year  in Circulation    Still Outstanding  Outstanding  Government  Residual 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1734         
1735  56,595    47,924        7,374   3,108   -1,811 
1736  57,864    47,924    11,198   3,108   -4,366 
1737  69,856    47,924    16,160   3,108       2,664 
1738         …     47,924           …     
1739  79,820    47,924    19,728     12,168 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes and Sources: Behrens (1923, pp. 20-30); Brock (1975, pp. 100-105); Smith (1985, pp. 
1,204-1,205). The annual charges of government or “journal expenses” as they were called 
amount to a total of 9,324 for the years 1735, 1736, and 1737. This sum was simply apportioned 
equally across these years in the table above. The residual captures the fact that the distribution 
of bills to the taxables of the province may not have been completed in 1735-1736 so that 
number may be lower than indicated, that the annual charges of government may not have been 
equally apportioned across the years indicated, and that the timing of the spending of certain 
special sums specifically appropriated in the Act to build a house for the governor (3,000), repair 
public buildings in Annapolis (500), and to be paid to each county to erect a prison therein (500 
each) is not known. The high residual in 1739 may largely account for these last special sums. 
For example, Maryland has 14 countries (in 1750) * 500 + 3,000 + 500 = 10,500. 
 
  Some have attributed the early depreciation of the Maryland paper pound to the size of 
the emission and/or its manner of distribution. For example, the prominent Maryland lawyer 
Daniel Dulany wrote about the paper money that, “The old proverb, lightly come, lightly go, was 
strongly exemplified.” But as shown in Table 1, the size was not excessive by colonial standards, 
and the manner of distribution was independent of its legislated legal uses and what supported its 
value (Gould, 1915, pp. 86, 88-89). Something else must have mattered.  
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Figure 3  The Value of Paper Money Relative to Par, 1734-1739 
 
Notes and Sources: Par equals 133.33 Maryland Pounds unit of account current money per 100 
Pounds Sterling. “Current money,” also known as “Proclamation money,” is the Maryland pound 
unit of account as set in 1709-1753. The value of Maryland pound paper money and of sterling 
bills of exchange relative to par in current money is taken from McCusker (1978, pp. 189-204) 
with the circles and triangles being the discrete data points. One third of the paper money 
authorized in 1733 was to be redeemed at par in October of 1748 and two-thirds at par in 
October of 1764 in its sterling equivalent to current money (Archives of Maryland, v. 39, pp. 
105-110). Present value calculations are weighted accordingly with the squares being simply the 
October to October year markers. 
 
a. Expected Inadequacy of the Sinking Fund? 
Smith (1985, pp. 1,199-1,208) argues that the early depreciation and below-par exchange 
rate for Maryland’s paper money was caused by the relative small contemporaneous sums in the   47
sinking fund. The fund was simply too small to inspire confidence that redemption as promised 
would happen. Smith, however, confuses current accumulated sums in the sinking fund, both 
theoretically and econometrically, for what the expected fund would have at the time redemption 
was to be executed. People knew that the fund was accumulating over time. They were not that 
myopic or stupid. 
Smith (1985, pp. 1,199-1,208) also assumes that the full authorization of 90,000 
Maryland paper pounds was to be redeemed via the sinking fund. This seems to be erroneous as 
the paper money circulated on loan was to be recouped as loan repayments in said money, and 
the annual charges of government were to be recouped through tax payment in said money 
(Archives of Maryland, v. 39, pp. 92-113; Behrens, 1923, pp.20-21; Brock, 1975, pp. 100-103; 
Gould, 1915, pp. 84-111). As such, the amounts that were potentially exposed to be redeemed 
via the sinking fund were only the bills of credit distributed to the province’s taxables and those 
used on the building projects, which amounted to approximately 58,424 Maryland paper pounds 
not 90,000 Maryland paper pounds. In addition, some unknown portion of the 58,424 sum may 
have been or could have been recouped via tax payments before the redemption dates. As such, 
Smith seriously underestimates the perceived adequacy of the sinking fund.  
From 1736 to 1740, the sinking fund was growing at an average rate of 1,889 pounds 
sterling in market value per year, see Table 2. If that rate was forecast to continue indefinitely, 
then by 1748 when one-third of the Maryland paper pounds outstanding would have to be 
redeemed at par in sterling, the sinking find would have 25,647 pounds sterling in it. This sum 
when exchanged at par converts to 34,195 Maryland paper pounds (at the par of 1.3333 
Maryland pounds per pounds sterling). This in turn would be more than enough to meet the 
promised redemption in the 1733 Paper Money Act for 1748 (Archives of Maryland, v. 39, pp.   48
105-110). One-third of 58,424 would be 19,475 Maryland paper pounds that would be needed to 
be redeemed in 1748.
7  Even if we assume that people thought that one-third of the full £90,000 
authorization was to be redeemed in 1748, there would be enough in the sinking fund to do that 
at the expected accumulation rate. 
At the growth rate of the sinking fund from 1736-1740 of 1,889 pounds sterling per year, 
by 1764 the fund would have 55,873 in pounds sterling value in it (ignoring any payout in 1748). 
This amount at par converts to 74,495 Maryland paper pounds. Subtracting the 19,475 expected 
to be paid out in 1748 leaves 55,020 Maryland paper pounds that the fund was expected to be 
able to redeem at par in 1764. The amount that was expected to have to be redeemed in 1764 was 
two-thirds of 58,424 or 38,949. Thus, in 1739 Marylanders would have expected that there 
would be enough in the sinking fund by 1764 to fulfill the redemption as promised.
8   
Of course, this is the expectation from the viewpoint of the late 1730s. The beginning of 
hostilities in 1740 leading into the War of the Austrian Succession which lasted to 1748, and the 
Seven Years War from 1755-1762, altered trade, fiscal, and monetary realities—though it is 
unlikely that exactly how it would do so could have been forecasted in the 1730s. Even so, the 
sums estimated here as required to be redeem in 1748 and 1764 and the expected sums in the 
sinking fund are very close to the actually sums accumulated and redeemed.
9  
In short, the expected sinking fund, and as it turned out the actual sinking fund, was more 
than adequate for redeeming the Maryland paper pound as the 1733 Act promised. The 
inadequacy of the sinking fund was not the reason for the depreciation and loss of value of the 
Maryland paper pound in the late 1730s. 
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b. Inability to Use Paper Money as a Circulating Medium: Paper Money as an Asset Only 
  As the price of tobacco rose above the 10 shillings per 100 pounds of tobacco tax 
assessment equivalent after 1734, tax collectors and those whose income was derived from local 
taxes found ways to refuse accepting paper money for tax payments and instead insisted on being 
paid in tobacco. Since tobacco sold at above 10 shillings per 100 pounds, they earned more value 
on a 10 shilling tax assessment by taking 100 pounds of tobacco than 10 shillings of paper 
money. Certain taxes had been exempted in the 1733 Act from being paid in paper money, such 
as the 40 shilling ecclesiastical poll tax and payments to the Lord Proprietor. The incentive was 
for these exemptions to be strictly adhered to by the tax revenue receiver. 
The most powerful tool of disruption, however, was in the hands of the local sheriff—the 
local tax collector. The 1733 Paper Money Act stated that taxes not paid by April 10
th could be 
demanded in tobacco rather than in paper money. Sheriffs “used all sorts of artifices to keep 
away from the people who wished to pay their taxes in money…before April 10, and then, when 
this date was passed, they required a larger amount of money if they accepted it instead of 
tobacco.” Interestingly, this problem was anticipated by a conference committee of the 
legislature in March of 1733 when reviewing the Paper Money Act shortly before it was passed. 
The committee opined “That should the option remain as in the bill of paying money or tobacco 
it would occasion almost endless disputes between officers lawyers and sheriffs and their sureties 
about paying money instead of tobacco, or tobacco instead of money…”  (Archives of Maryland, 
v. 39, pp. 32, 95-96; Behrens, 1923, p. 23; Gould, 1915, pp. 89-91)  Based on the estimates of 
total Maryland paper pounds outstanding, there also appears to have been little reduction in this 
total that could be ascribed to tax redemption and retirement of bills (Brock, 1975, pp. 104-105; 
Smith, 1985, pp. 1,204-1,205, and Table 3 above). In other words, what anchored the   50
contemporaneous value of Maryland’s paper money—its usefulness and certainty for paying 
current taxes—was lost. 
If the paper money lost its usefulness as a circulating medium of exchange, then it 
reverted to being just a store of value, i.e. an asset. As an asset, it would be paid off or redeemed 
in real value (pounds sterling) only in the distant future, one-third in 1748 and two-thirds in 
1764. It was like a zero-interest bond or zero-interest loan. Only the face-value principal would 
be paid at these future “maturity” dates. The contemporaneous value or price of such an asset at a 
given time is the discount present value of that future payoff. One hundred pounds in 30 years is 
not the same as 100 pounds today.  
This asset pricing principal was clearly understood. In fact, Benjamin Franklin explained 
it well and in reference to understanding the early depreciation of the Maryland paper pound. On 
February 13, 1767 Franklin wrote (Labaree, 1970, v. 14, pp. 35-38):  
…a bill [paper money] promising payment at distant periods of time…depending solely 
on such distant payment for its value…is not and cannot possibly be of value equal to the 
sum expressed in it, but must suffer a discount in proportion to time. Hence the discount 
will be greatest soon after the bills are issued, that is, as soon as the nature of them begins 
to be understood; and, as the term of payment approaches, the discount will gradually 
become less till it amounts to nothing worth notice.  
 
Franklin then directly noted that this was the case for Maryland’s paper pound. 
  Figure 3 presents what the discounted present value of Maryland’s paper pound would 
be, in terms of a percentage deviation below par, or full payoff value, at three different discount 
rates, namely at 4, 6, and 8 percent. Four percent was the rate that Maryland loaned paper 
money. This rate, however, seems to be a below-market rate. Six percent would seem closer to 
an average market rate. Finally, 8 percent might be considered reasonable if adding a little extra 
to the discount rate would be required to account for the likelihood of some unforecastable shock 
hitting the economy, such as wars or other trade and weather disasters that might interfere with   51
the government’s redemption abilities. While the data on the value of paper money is thin, after 
1735 it does seem to fall around these discount rates, particularly the 6 to 8 percent rates for the 
period 1736-1739. So maybe Franklin was right! The current value of Maryland’s paper pound 
perfectly reflected its present discounted value to redemption. 
Conclusions 
In the end, who really gained from this paper money scheme? While the answer is a bit 
speculative, assuming the analysis above is compelling then most likely no one gained. The 
province as a whole was a net loser. First, Marylanders were given paper money to destroy 
tobacco at a rate that perfectly offset the tobacco destroyed with regard to what was needed in 
paper money to pay taxes. But the tax system was designed in such a way as to inhibit using this 
paper money to pay taxes. Thus the paper money’s value reverted to that of an asset or store of 
value to be paid off in the distant future. This was a net loss to anyone who burnt tobacco in 
exchange for paper money (over half of the total paper money authorized). It would be like 
agreeing to burn $5 today in exchange for being given $5 thirty years from now.  
Second, the destruction of tobacco likely had no effect on tobacco prices. Reduction of 
output in Maryland was simply offset by replacement output expansion elsewhere, such as in 
Virginia and North Carolina. The rise in tobacco prices after 1733 was unrelated to Maryland’s 
tobacco destruction, being due to the expansion of French demand in the market which would 
have happened anyway whether Maryland destroyed some of its tobacco or not. Marylanders 
threw away valuable, even if trashy, tobacco in exchange for nothing from the tobacco market.  
Third, Maryland tobacco planter/exporters had to pay for this paper money scheme 
through a contemporaneous tax of 15d sterling per hogshead of tobacco exported. Assuming that 
French demand was relatively elastic due to their easy ability to substitute into Virginia Oronoco   52
tobacco, Maryland planters had to eat most of this tax (bear most of its burden via reduced 
profits). These export tax monies were to cover the redemption of the paper money asset in the 
distant future. Maryland tobacco planter/exporters were net losers.  
Finally, the provincial government may have been a small winner in that it did get to use 
some small portion of the paper money authorized (11 to 12 percent) to finance the building of 
public structures early on. These expenditures were likely to be paid eventually by the planters 
who paid the 15d sterling per hogshead tobacco export tax, by those who ended up holding the 
paper money as an asset for future redemption, and by anyone who happened to succeed in using 
the paper money to pay taxes. The government also earned some interest income on the sums 
loaned out at 4 percent—£5,663 on all loans from 1733 through 1748 (Gould, 1915, p. 93).  
Maryland’s paper money creation story is both complex and unique among the colonies, 
which explains the complex and less than stellar performance of its early paper money system. If 
there are lessons to be learned, it might be that creating a modern paper money economy should 
not be an afterthought or ancillary to manipulating a prime export market. In the process of 
creating a paper money economy as a vehicle to influence the tobacco trade, the balancing of the 
political constituencies that were needed to get a consensus lead to a dual currency system: paper 
money and tobacco “money.” Such a dual currency system is unworkable for money used as a 
medium of exchange as long as the government fixes, but cannot defend, a payment exchange 
rate between these two monies that is different from the market exchange rate. Market forces 
pushed tobacco prices so that paper money became primarily a store of value—having little 
utility as a medium of exchange for those who controlled the tax collection system. As a store of 
value, paper money’s contemporaneous value in the marketplace correctly reflected its present 
discounted “asset” value in reference to its distant future payoff date.  53
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Footnotes  
                                                 
    
1 Tobacco was packed (prized) and then transported or shipped mostly in hogsheads or large 
wooden barrels (Middleton, 1984, pp. 112-116, 129-134). A typical hogshead of tobacco in the 
1720s in Maryland averaged 780 pounds of tobacco (Historical Statistics of the United States, 
2006, p. 5-684). 
    
2 Claims on tobacco production, namely contracts transferring the ownership of particular 
hogsheads of tobacco in designated planters’ warehouses or barns that were awaiting export were 
also used to convey tobacco “money” as a medium-of-exchange. Such claims or contracts could 
pass through several hands before the actual tobacco was shipped, with the last claimant gaining 
the sterling credits in London from the sale of that tobacco. That claimant could then draw on 
those credits via bills of exchange. These “tobacco crop notes” and “tobacco transfer notes,” 
however, only really came into use after the initiation of the public warehouse tobacco inspection 
system—after 1730 in Virginia and 1747 in Maryland. Given that this time period for Maryland 
is well after the initial creation of paper money in Maryland, this type of tobacco “money” is not 
an issue here (Middleton, 1984, pp. 137-141). 
    
3 Ebenezer Cook (1900, p. 49) explained this state of affairs in his poem published in 
Annapolis in 1730 by William Parks, the publisher of the Maryland Gazette, called Sotweed 
Redivivus. Or the Planters Looking-Glass in Burlesque Verse. Therein he writes: 
  Bring hither, from the mines of Spain, 
  Moidores, Pistoles, and Cobbs, full weight; 
  The very best of Spanish plate. 
  But whether, with us they would stay, 
Is a hard task for me to say; 
Since current coin, in every state, 
Invented was, to circulate: 
And to restrain it, is as hard, 
As Luna’s motion to retard, 
Unless, by act of limitation,   57
                                                                                                                                                             
We could make Maryland its station: 
Oblige it like the constant sun,  
Beyond it tropics not to run, 
Potomac river, (that’s to say) 
And Delaware’s exuberant bay. 
But copper-coin, like vagrant cain, 
Would never wander into Spain, 
Or long in misers bags remain. 
 
    
4 Tobacco was shipped and purchased in hogsheads. Hogsheads were quite large. It would 
have been easy to pack the top with high quality leaf and then fill the bulk with trash tobacco. 
Thus the more trash tobacco in the market as a portion of total tobacco, the greater the risk of a 
buyer getting stuck with excessive trash tobacco. Thus, buyers would discount the price of all 
tobaccos offered for purchase. 
    
5 The 1731 version of the bill had the revenue for the sinking fund coming from a tax on the 
importation of slaves, Irish servants, and liquor. This funding scheme would have been more 
slanted toward small farmers and the lower classes paying for the scheme since they were 
relative greater consumers of liquor and Irish servants (Archives of Maryland, v. 37, p. 344; 
Behrens, 1923, pp. 14-15). 
    
6 The scale or level of the estimate could be affected by the roughness and variation in the 
hogshead-to-pound (weight) conversion, whether the legal or the market average hogshead 
weight is used in the estimate, in the lag between production and stock investment, and by the 
fact that exports are not the same as imports for a number of reasons, such as smuggling leakage, 
shipping loss, etc. 
    
7 Between 1748 and 1749 the amount of Maryland paper pounds outstanding fell by 24,040 
(from 86,040 to 62,000). This amount can be taken as the approximate amount redeemed through 
the sinking fund in late 1748. Derived from Brock (1975, pp. 104, 418); Smith (1985, pp. 1,204-  58
                                                                                                                                                             
1,205). This estimated sum actually redeemed via the sinking fund is close to the £19,475 that 
was estimated as the sum to be redeemed in 1748 from the perspective of 1739. 
    
8 In 1764 the amount of Maryland paper pounds still outstanding that were redeemed was 
41,295. This is close to the £38,949 estimated here as what was expected in 1739 that would 
need to be redeemed in 1764 and no where near the £60,000 implied by taking two-thirds of the 
£90,000 initial authorized amount as assumed by some (Smith, 1985, pp. 1,204-1,205).  
    
9 See footnotes 7 and 8. 